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THE MISSING LINK IN ROYALTY ANALYSIS:
AN ESSAY ON RESOLVING VALUE-BASED
ROYALTY DISPUTES
David E. Piercet
INTRODUCTION

The oil and gas lease is intended to document a business transaction
between the landowner' and oil and gas developer. The developer
obtains the right to enter the landowner's property to search for, develop, produce, and take title to oil and gas. The landowner is compensated with a royalty on oil and gas produced from the land.2 The
royalty may be an actual share of the oil and gas produced, or it may
be a payment of money. A combination of the two occurs frequently:
a share of oil production for oil royalty and a payment of money for
gas royalty.3

In most cases, if production is obtained from the leased land, the
royalty will become the primary source of landowner compensation
under the leasing transaction. Once the oil and gas lease is entered
into, and production has been obtained, there are only two ways a
lessor can maximize his royalty income: (1) increase the volume of
production; (2) increase the value of production. The situs of the lessor's volume- and value-enhancing efforts is often a courthouse. This
article focuses on the value-enhancing issues associated with the oil
and gas lease 4 and offers what the author believes is a frequently applied, but previously unarticulated analysis for resolving value-based
royalty disputes. This "missing link" analysis focuses on a fundamental issue courts must address to properly resolve lessor/lessee value
disputes. When does the lease relationship come to an end? The
analysis is neutral as to which party should prevail.5 The analysis
merely asks the critical question that should assist in resolving many
collateral royalty value disputes when answered.
t Professor of Law, Washburn University School of Law.
1. The term "landowner" is being used to encompass severed mineral interest
owners as well as persons owning the surface and mineral estates.
2. See EUGENE 0. KuTrz ET AL., OIL AND GAS LAW 220, 355-58 (3d ed. 1998).
Other landowner compensation may include a cash bonus, delay rental, shut-in royalty, minimum royalty, and compensatory royalty.
3. See infra note 11 and accompanying text.
4. The volume enhancing issues relate to the lessee's diligent development of the
lease. I have reviewed the inherent lessor/lessee conflicts associated with volumeenhancing disputes in previous writings. See David E. Pierce, Rethinking the Oil and
Gas Lease, 22 TULSA L.J. 445, 459-60 (1987); David E. Pierce, CoordinatedReservoir
Development-An Alternative to the Rule of Capturefor the Ownership and Development of Oil and Gas: Part I, 4 J. ENERGY L. & POL'Y 1, 33-49 (1983).
5. However, a failure to apply the analysis of when a lease relationship comes to
an end typically works to the detriment of the lessee and in favor of the lessor.
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The "life" and "death" on an oil and gas lease is fairly easy to identify. Once the lease is signed and delivered by the lessor, and is accepted by the lessee, an oil and gas lease relationship is formed. The
life of the lease will typically terminate when there is a failure to pay
delay rentals, commence operations, or when there is an inability to
produce in paying quantities. Although there may be disputes concerning whether a lease-terminating event has occurred, the judicial
analysis is fairly well defined for resolving these disputes. However,
courts have not articulated an analysis for determining when in the life
of the lease the lease "relationship" ends. At what point in the oil and
gas development and production process are the lessor and lessee no
longer contractually obligated to one another? When has the relationship run its course?
Although the parties' rights and obligations continue under the oil
and gas lease, courts must define the limits of the document's sphere
of influence. Only then can courts make accurate decisions concerning value-based royalty disputes. When a challenged activity falls
outside the scope of the lease relationship, the analysis is at an end.
There will be no contractual basis for asserting rights or imposing obligations on the parties. There can be no rights or duties if there is no
contractual relationship. Similarly, there can be no implied obligations which of necessity must emanate from some sort of contractual
relationship if there is no contractual relationship. Unfortunately,
courts, litigants, and commentators have attempted to define and enforce contractual rights in "enhanced value" royalty disputes without
addressing the basic question-is there even a contractual relationship
to define and enforce? The basic task is to define, relying upon the
express terms of the lease, where the parties intended their lease relationship to end.
A. Missing Link Analysis in "Enhanced Value" Disputes
In many royalty value disputes the litigants, and therefore the
courts, attempt to resolve issues concerning the lease relationship
without first defining its legal boundaries. This is best illustrated by
the current flurry of oil "posted price" cases and analogous natural gas
value cases. It is ironic that courts and commentators have for years
lauded the simplicity of oil royalty calculation as compared to gas royalty. However, as natural gas became deregulated and took on marketing patterns similar to oil, instead of simplifying royalty calculation
and reducing the number of royalty disputes, the deregulation has
triggered parallel litigation concerning gas and oil.
Gas deregulation most likely triggered the oil royalty litigation of
today. Lessors and their counsel have always been conditioned to
look for more value in the gas context. When gas was deregulated,
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the royalty owner could readily observe transactions in which gas was
being sold to an affiliate or division of the lessee in the field and then
subsequently marketed for a higher price somewhere downstream of
the field.6 This gave the lessor a bigger price to shoot for in their
quest to maximize royalty income under their existing contract. Oil,
which has been the object of a more vertically integrated industry
since its inception, offered the lessor a similar opportunity. In contrast, the gas industry, at least from the 1940s7 through the 1980s, has
not been vertically integrated. Following deregulation, it became
possible for the gas industry to integrate the exploration and production function with downstream value-added aspects of the natural gas
business. Previously such integration was not possible because access
to essential natural gas pipeline networks was not available.' However, varying degrees of vertical integration have always been possible
with oil and have been a common practice since the industry began.
Consider the following hypothetical to appreciate how the missing
link analysis can be used in the enhanced value situation: If we accept
the notion that a barrel of oil in a stock tank is worth $X, and that the
same barrel of oil, when aggregated with other volumes and delivered
at some distance to another purchaser is worth $X+, how do we calculate royalty? Assuming a 1/4th royalty, does the lessor get 1/4th of $X
or 1/4th of $X+? In this situation the lessor may even be willing to
voluntarily share in the transportation cost to get the oil to the ultimate purchaser if $X+ minus transportation costs is still more than
$X. The motivation of the lessor is evident: they will always seek 1/
4th of $X+ when it yields them a greater royalty. The motivation of
the lessee is evident: Since the additional royalty revenue will come
out of the lessee's funds, they will oppose the lessor's demands unless
the result is dictated by their lease agreement.
The missing link analysis requires that the court evaluate where the
lease relationship ends. Does the oil and gas lease contemplate that
6. See Judith M. Matlock, Payment of Gas Royalties in Affiliate Transactions,48
GAS L. & TAX'N 9-1 (1997) (comparing oil and gas transactions
before and after deregulation).
7. The event which made vertical integration unlikely in the gas industry was the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Fed. Power
Comm'n, 331 U.S. 682 (1947), holding that sales of natural gas from wells owned by
an interstate pipeline were subject to the cost-of-service ratemaking authority of the
Federal Power Commission under the Natural Gas Act of 1938. The practical effect
of this case was to cause interstate pipelines to get out of the exploration, development, and production aspects of the gas industry. If they could only be compensated
through a regulated rate of return for their exploration, development, and production
activities, there was no incentive to engage in these riskier components of the gas
industry. The compensation they could obtain under the public utility regulatory process would seldom approach the sort of returns necessary to finance high-risk upstream activities.
8. Unlike natural gas pipelines, interstate oil pipelines have been operated as
common carriers since 1906. Pub. L. No. 337, § 1, 34 Stat. 584 (1906) (enacting the
"Hepburn Amendment" to the Interstate Commerce Act).
INST. ON OIL AND
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the rights and obligations of the parties, their "relationship," will end
at the wellhead, stock tank, field, main transportation pipeline, regional market center, national market center, refinery, bulk gasoline
distribution terminal, or retail gas station? In the past, the implied
covenant to market has been relied upon by lessors to try to extend
the limits of the relationship to include the lessee's downstream activities. 9 However, the implied covenant should only operate within the
limits of the relationship. Therefore, if the relationship ends at the
field, no implied covenant should operate beyond the field level. If
there is no longer a contractual relationship between the parties, then
there will be no basis to attach implied obligations. 10 There is no underlying obligation to which it can attach.
B. Defining the Limits of the Relationship
The express terms of the oil and gas lease should define the scope of
the contractual undertaking of the parties, and thereby define the limits of their relationship. Often the most useful defining language will
be found in the royalty clause. The "last act" in the production process is typically the lessee's disposition of production. The lease relationship, pertaining to that barrel of oil or thousand cubic feet of gas,
is at an end once such a royalty-defining event has taken place.
Although the relationship continues with regard to oil and gas still in
the ground and in the production process, once it progresses through
the royalty-defining stage, the parties are no longer contractually
bound regarding the production. There may be issues concerning
whether the lessee has complied with express and implied terms of the
lease leading up to the royalty-defining event, but those inquiries
should not be impacted by what each party does with his share of the
lease benefits following the royalty-defining event.
To illustrate the analysis, consider the following royalty clause:
The royalties to be paid by Lessee are as follows: On oil, oneeighth of that produced and saved from said land, the same to be
delivered at the wells or to the credit of Lessor into the pipe line to
9. See Wood v. TXO Prod. Corp., 854 P.2d 880 (Okla. 1992).
10. See HECI Exploration Co. v. Neel, 42 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 93, No. 97-0403, slip op.
1998 WL 750977 (Oct. 29, 1998) (not released for publication at this time). Here the
Supreme Court of Texas observed:
This Court has not lightly implied covenants in mineral leases ....

Our deci-

sions have repeatedly emphasized that courts "cannot make contracts for
[the] parties.".....

A covenant will not be implied unless it appears from the

express terms of the contract that "it was so clearly within the contemplation
of the parties that they deemed it unnecessary to express it," and therefore
they omitted to do so, or "it must appear that it is necessary to infer such a
covenant in order to effectuate the full purpose of the contract as a whole as
gathered from the written instrument."... A court cannot imply a covenant
to achieve what it believes to be a fair contract or to remedy an unwise or
improvident contract ....
Id. at 7.
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which the wells may be connected. Lessee shall have the option to
purchase any royalty oil in its possession, paying the market price
therefor prevailing for the field where produced on the date of
purchase. On gas, including casinghead gas, condensate or other
gaseous substances, produced from said land and sold or used off
the premises or for the extraction of gasoline or other products
therefrom, the market value at the well of one-eighth of the gas so
sold or used, provided that on gas sold at the wells the royalty shall
be one-eighth of the amount realized from such sale. 1 '
Assuming there is no other language in the lease expressly defining
the scope of the parties' relationship, the royalty clause will be of paramount importance-particularly with regard to an enhanced value
dispute. Under this royalty clause the following possibilities exist:
1. The relationship ends once production is delivered "at the
wells."
2. The relationship ends once production is delivered to "the pipeline to which the wells may be connected."
3. The relationship ends once production leaves the "field where
produced."
4. The relationship ends once production is "off the premises" of
the lease.
5. The relationship ends at different locations depending upon the
substance being marketed and the specific facts surrounding the
marketing transaction.
Although a court will often have to resolve various factual and interpretive issues, the missing link analysis should establish the absolute outer limits' 2 of the relationship. Under the foregoing clause the
outer limits of the relationship would in most cases be the "field
where produced." Therefore, if the lessee produces a barrel of oil or a
thousand cubic feet of gas that is valued at $X in the "field where
produced," it should make no difference to the lessor that the lessee,
its affiliated marketing company, or an unrelated third party, obtained
$X+ for the production somewhere beyond the "field where produced." By defining the scope of the relationship, the missing link
analysis also defines the exploration, development, and production
business in which the lessor and lessee participate. It also serves as
the line of demarcation for lessee businesses in which the lessor is not
entitled to participate.
11. A.A.P.L. FORM

675-MODEL FORM OPERATING AGREEMENT

(Am. Ass'n of

Petroleum Landmen 1993).
12. The phrase "outer limits" is being used to indicate that the actual limit under a
certain set of facts may be something less than the "field where produced," but it will
not be anything greater than, or beyond, the "field where produced." In many instances the dispute may not require any greater precision than defining the outer
limits of the relationship.
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The missing link analysis does not define the royalty due. Instead, it
defines the limits under which the express and implied covenants of
the oil and gas lease will operate. For example, under the previouslyquoted royalty clause the lessee will have an implied covenant to seek
out markets for gas, casinghead gas, condensate, and other gaseous
substances produced from the lease so as to trigger a royalty obligation. The outer limits of the lessee's marketing obligation for oil will
be within the "field where produced." The outer limits of the lessee's
obligation for gas will not extend beyond the wellhead or leased premises. In any event, if a sale is made off the leased premises for $X+,
the royalty due will be governed by the express royalty clause provisions requiring royalty at the market value "at the well." The location
for determining the scope of the relationship would not change the
express lease clauses concerning location for royalty valuation
purposes.
II.

TRADITIONAL ANALYSIS IN ENHANCED VALUE DISPUTES

Enhanced value disputes arise whenever the lessee elects to try to
capture some of the potential post-production profit associated with
aggregating, transporting, treating, packaging, and reselling oil and
gas. The lessee's view is that once it pays the royalty on the produced
oil and gas, it can then do whatever it wants with the full production
stream. However, lessees have been willing, for administrative convenience, to permit the lessor to share in some downstream enhancement value so long as the lessee can deduct a share of the
enhancement costs attributable to the lessor's share of the benefits.
Such gratuitous acts on the part of the lessee have proven most unwise. For example, if the oil and gas lease provides for a royalty equal
to "the market value at the well of one-eighth of the gas," a lessee
may choose to pay royalty based upon the market value at a central
delivery point in the field less the cost of gathering and compressing
the gas to get it to the central delivery point. Assuming the gas is
worth more at the central delivery point, less costs, than it is at the
wellhead, an overpayment of royalty to the lessor will result.
Such lessee benevolence creates expectations that are often contrary to the terms of the oil and gas lease. Also, once there is a departure from the terms of the royalty clause to calculate royalty, lessor
expectations can rise to include demands that they share in enhanced
values beyond the central delivery point, that no costs be deducted, or
that the costs being deducted are excessive. Many lessee royalty
problems are self-inflicted because lessees have been willing to let
their lessors share in the benefits of downstream activities when it is
not required by their oil and gas leases.
When interpreting the "market value at the well" royalty measure,
many courts will seek to use a work-back method to calculate market
value when the lessee has been paying royalty on downstream pro-
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ceeds less post-wellhead costs.' 3 However, this will typically result in
an overpayment of royalty because the lessor will be receiving a share
of the downstream "profit" in addition to the wellhead value of the
gas. Instead, lessees should attempt to structure the royalty calculation so that a wellhead value is identified as the gas emerges from the
ground. This would require a defensible valuation of the gas at the
well at the time it is produced. It may require actually selling some
gas at the wellhead from time-to-time to establish comparable sales
for use in determining wellhead market values.' 4 Although affiliate
transactions will be challenged, it would seem prudent to use a separate legal entity to purchase gas at the wellhead at all times. The affiliate nature of the relationship can be mitigated by using the same
entity to make wellhead purchases of gas from unaffiliated third parties. This would also provide a third party comparable sales
benchmark.
The enhanced-value issues are becoming even more interesting as
lessees begin taking gas in the field and using it to generate electricity
in the field. 5 If the lessee's electricity proceeds less generating costs
are greater than the wellhead value of the gas used to generate the
electricity, will the lessor be entitled to more royalty based upon the
electricity sales? In this situation the separate lessee business is more
pronounced, but not that much different from running the gas through
a processing plant to market residue gas and gas liquids. The missing
link analysis will be useful in all of these situations by defining the
point at which the lessee ceases to be a "lessee" and becomes an independent oil industry entrepreneur.
CONCLUSION

The bulk of royalty litigation today concerns lessors seeking to
share in benefits generated by their lessees' downstream activities.
The traditional response to such disputes has been to classify the activities as either "production" or "post-production" and allow the les13. See Piney Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co., 726 F.2d 225, 242 (5th
Cir. 1984).
14. Comparable sales in the relevant area are generally regarded as the best evidence of market value. In Heritage Resources, Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118

(Tex. 1996), the Supreme Court of Texas observed:
Market value at the well has a commonly accepted meaning in the oil and
gas industry. Market value is the price a willing seller obtains from a willing
buyer. There are two methods to determine market value at the well. The
most desirable method is to use comparable sales. A comparable sale is one
that is comparable in time, quality, and availability of marketing outlets.
Courts use the second method when information about comparable sales is
not readily available. This method involves subtracting reasonable post-production marketing costs from the market value at the point of sale.

Id. at 122 (citations omitted).
15. In-Field Generator Opens Opportunity, 41 AM. OIL & GAS REP. 72
1998).
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sor to share in "production" activity benefits-unless their lease
provides otherwise.16 Some courts in recent years have relied upon
the implied covenant to market to push "post-production" activities
into the "production" category.' 7
These enhanced-value disputes should be approached by first defining the scope of the parties' relationship under the oil and gas lease.
In most instances the oil and gas lease contemplates a relationship
that begins, and ends, at the leased premises. The Texas Supreme
Court has recognized that the lessee's implied obligations must be defined as though the lessee has only one lease, divorced from all other
business relationships and the lessee's broader business concerns.' 8
This same concept would seem to operate with regard to lessee rights
and lessor obligations under an oil and gas lease, whether it is the
product of an express or implied covenant. Therefore, the lessor will
not suffer the burdens of the lessee's extra-lease businesses nor will
the lessor enjoy the benefits.
The missing link analysis provides a contract-based approach to defining the point at which the lessee can freely engage in value-enhancing activities without fear of having its actions questioned or its profits
taken. The lessor, in turn, gets what it bargained for: the value of
production as it is produced, without regard for the lessee's extralease businesses or concerns.

16. See David E. Pierce, IncorporatingA Century of Oil and Gas Jurisprudence
into the "Modern" Oil and Gas Lease, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 786, 819-28 (1994) (discussing the various production and post-production business activities).
17. I have referred to this in prior writings as the "marketable product" game. See
David E. Pierce, Developments in Nonregulatory Oil and Gas Law: The Continuing
Search for Analytical Foundations,47 INST. ON OIL AND GAS L. & TAX'N 1-1, 1-43 to
1-48 (1996).
18. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563, 569 (Tex. 1981).
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